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This paper examines the democratisation agenda laid out by Western governments 
for the North African region vis-à-vis their Realpolitik conflict containment 
approach towards the Western Sahara conflict. Western policymakers conceive 
the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as a safety 
net that contains tension in the region and enables geo-strategic and economic 
partnerships with Algeria and Morocco. This paper underlines that the 
international community could play a greater role in promoting the long-term 
stability of the North African region by pursuing innovative policies geared 
towards addressing the root causes of the Western Sahara conflict.
* Dr. Andreu Solà-Martín is Consultant Lecturer at the Open University of Catalonia 





Firstly, this paper attempts to problematise the current strategy of Western States 
towards democratisation in North Africa by looking at the role played by the 
Bush administration and the European Union (EU) through the Mediterranean 
Partnership in the Western Sahara case study. The conflict in Western Sahara dates 
back to 1975, when the United Nations (UN) decided to sponsor a referendum 
for the self-determination of the inhabitants of the Spanish Sahara, but Morocco 
and Mauritania invaded the colony before this was organised (Hodges 1983; 
Pazzanita and Hodges 1994; Diego Aguirre 1991). In 1988, Morocco and the 
POLISARIO Front1 signed the Settlement Proposals under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and a peacekeeping mission was deployed 
to supervise the ceasefire between both parties and to facilitate the organisation 
of the referendum. However, firstly disagreements in relation to the voters list 
and secondly Moroccan unwillingness to go ahead with any revised version of 
the UN peace plan involving a referendum with an option for independence 
have led to the current deadlock. Despite the UN settlement proposals have not 
been implemented, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO) effectively monitors the ceasefire and the region remains 
relatively stable. It can be argued that although the conflict is contained, the 
political future of the territory remains on hold, and the grievances of Saharawi 
people are unattended (Shelley 2004; Solà-Martín 2006).
Western Sahara has an estimated population of 273 000 inhabitants and several 
thousand refugees living in Tindouf, Algeria.2 The territory has lucrative natural 
resources including phosphates, iron ore, sand and extensive fishing along 
the Atlantic Coast. Since 2001, after oil/gas reserves were discovered off-shore 
Mauritania, Morocco granted reconnaissance licenses to Total and Kerr McGee 
to explore possible oil/gas reserves off-shore Western Sahara (Olsson 2006). 
1 Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro.
2 The POLISARIO estimates there are 165 000 Saharawis living in camps in Tindouf, 
although the total population of concern assumed by The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as at January 2009 is 116 561. See: <http://
www.unhcr.org>. UNHCR recently requested Algeria to authorise a survey of Saharawi 
refugees in its territory.
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This territory has also a geo-strategic value as a crossroads of traditional trading 
routes between the Sahel and the Maghreb regions and the Western Saharan 
harbours along the Atlantic coast can play a prominent role in transoceanic 
exports and imports. When Spanish colonisation brought urbanisation and an 
incipient industrialisation through the development of the Saharan phosphor 
mines, the Spanish Sahara became one of the African colonies with a highest 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Diego Aguirre 1988). Hence, the 
exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources for the benefit of the relatively 
small number of inhabitants would make an independent Saharan State 
economically viable. 
On democratic discourse and Realpolitik
The efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict have been jeopardised by the 
difficulties involved in trying to promote a democratic solution for a territory 
that is militarily controlled by an autocratic regime, the Moroccan government. 
In this sense, the promotion of a free and fair solution for the Western Sahara 
conflict should be examined in the context of the ongoing debate on the 
relationship between democratisation, development and security in the North 
African region (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2004). In recent years, several 
western initiatives have focused on democracy promotion in the so-called Arab 
world or broader Middle East, including North Africa. However, this one size 
fits all approach neglects the extent to which autocracy is deeply ingrained 
in the political culture and idiosyncrasy of Arab regimes. In Morocco, Tozy 
has underlined the extent to which the monarch is the religious and political 
father of the nation and its citizens (Tozy 1999). Moreover, Western efforts at 
democratisation are tainted by a long history of collaboration between Western 
powers and the Arab elites dating back to the colonial period. The Arab Human 
Development Report (2005:12) acknowledged the prominent role played by key 
foreign powers in the political life of the region:
Arab countries cannot ignore the fact that the world, especially the powerful 
players in the global arena, will continue to safeguard their interests in the 
region. Their call for reform in Arab countries falls within this context.
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Upon completion, the Arab Human Development Report (2005) was strongly 
criticised by the United States (US) and Egyptian administrations and its 
publication was postponed. This report was written by a group of well-known 
intellectuals and independent experts from Arab countries. They bluntly 
criticised their regimes and asked: ‘Why, among all the regions of the world, 
do Arabs enjoy the least freedom?’ The document was only released in April 
2005 – after elections took place in Palestine, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Hosni 
Mubàrak announced political reforms in Egypt. At a conference in Brussels, 
all these changes were applauded by the Bush administration as steps towards 
democratisation (United States Government 2005a). In remarks at the 20th 
anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush 
announced that the United States would pursue a ‘forward strategy of freedom’ 
to promote democracy throughout the Middle East (United States Government 
2003). In the State of the Union (United States Government 2005b), President 
Bush emphasised its administration’s commitment to support political, social 
and economic reforms in the region:
America’s actions will result in the spread of democracy in the broader 
Middle East – an important step that will provide an alternative to terror 
and violence.
Nevertheless, the US president also pointed out that the US role in the Arab world 
was not to impose democratic reforms, except when it comes to confronting 
those who harbour terrorists (United States Government 2005b):
….successful reform in the broader Middle East will not be imposed from 
the outside; it must be chosen from within. Governments must choose 
to fight corruption, abandon old habits of control, protect the rights of 
conscience and the rights of minorities. Governments must invest in the 
health and education of their people, and take responsibility for solving 
problems instead of simply blaming others. Citizens must choose to hold 
their governments accountable.
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The Western Sahara conflict in the context of the War on Terror
In 2003, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Special Envoy for 
Western Sahara, James Baker, resigned after seven years of trying to persuade 
the parties to move along his diplomatic efforts. In August 2003, Álvaro de Soto 
replaced William Swing as a Special Representative for Western Sahara. The 
Peruvian diplomat held a 24-year long career at the UN system. Since 1999, 
he had been the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus.3 Nevertheless, 
Álvaro de Soto was not perceived by the parties as a relevant peacemaker. He 
certainly lacked Baker’s diplomatic weight to move the peace plan forward. 
In May 2005, Special Representative de Soto left MINURSO and in July 2005, 
Dutch Diplomat Peter van Walsum was appointed as a UN Special Envoy. After 
resigning, Baker expressed his views on the matter of Morocco’s lack of consent 
with the operation. He clarified his understanding of MINURSO’s role in the 
context of the US war on terror (1994): 
This is a really low intensity, low level dispute. Look, there’s no action forcing 
event in the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has won the war. She’s in 
possession. Why should she agree to anything? And so she is disinclined to 
do so. Well, there’s one very good reason why she should, because she will 
never receive the imprimatur of international legitimacy for her occupation 
of the territory unless she works out some arrangement that is blessed by 
the international community, blessed by the Security Council, or acceptable 
to the other party. That’s why we work so very hard on the idea of an initial 
autonomy arrangement with self-government and then a referendum at 
the end to meet the test, the requirement of the Security Council for Self-
Determination.
Baker’s point of view illustrates the extent to which the US diplomatic position 
in relation to the Western Sahara question is linked to strategic priorities. 
Morocco prides itself to be the oldest ally of the US. On 20 December 1777, 
Morocco was the first country to recognise the independence of the United 




States of America and in 1786 the Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship 
was signed between the two countries. The US military alliance with Morocco 
was forged during the Cold War period. During the 1950s, bomber bases were 
built at Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane and they were part of the Strategic Air 
Command’s network of strategic bomber bases pointed at the Soviet Union. 
Baker sees the history of world order as a dialectic continuum, i.e. the struggle 
for power between antagonist blocs throughout time. East-West dichotomy has 
been now bypassed by the war on terror.4 Morocco’s monarchy played a key role 
in Africa by supporting the US war against Communism. Now, the US and its 
security agencies are engaged in supporting Morocco’s regime policies against 
terrorist groups linked to radical salafism. The resolution of the Western Sahara 
conflict can be, once again, put on hold. 
The Western Sahara case is an illustrative example of the extent to which the 
politics of democratisation promoted by the US administration are constrained 
by the War on Terror. The policy of ‘either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists’ has led the US to support regimes in the region which rely on the use 
of coercion to maintain power. Nonetheless, these regimes are geo-strategic allies 
and economic partners of the West. Due to the security imperatives dictated 
by the War on Terror, the US administration has strengthened its military 
cooperation with the states of the Maghreb region. The US has preferential 
cooperation ties with Morocco (Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos 2004) and 
recently, there has been an improvement of relations between Algeria and the 
US government and other NATO members. Algeria and NATO made their first 
joint naval manoeuvres in the framework of their cooperation on the War on 
Terror and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the so-called Barcelona process 
(Martín 2002). At the UN level, American policy in relation to the Saharan 
question seeks equidistance between both major North African economic 
partners and allies in the War on Terror, Morocco and Algeria. In this sense, 
4 Baker on National Programming Service (2004): ‘[So, Morocco and Algeria to the United 
States, or perhaps to the international community, are more important why? Because of 
radical Islam?] - Well, they’re joining in the fight against terror. They’re helping the United 
States significantly, both of those countries. And of course they’re on different sides of this 
issue.’
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US policy in relation to the Saharan conflict is subordinated to its security and 
economic interests in the region. 
The War on Terror led by the US at the global scale has raised geo-strategic 
stakes in the region. In 2002, fears that the Sahara would become a hiding place 
for Salafist cells brought the US State Department to promote the so-called Pan-
Sahel initiative which was budgeted with more than $120 million (International 
Crisis Group 2005), aiming at giving training and providing anti-terrorist 
equipment to countries in the region bordering with the Sahara (Mali, Niger, 
Chad and Mauritania). The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) trained and equipped 
one rapid-reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the four Sahel 
states. This initiative was renamed and expanded in 2005 to include as new 
partners Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria. The new Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is conceived as a long-term interagency 
plan to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa by helping the participating 
countries ‘to stop the flow of illicit arms, goods, and people through the region’ 
(United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2005). The US Special Forces 
train their African counterparts in military tactics, marksmanship, planning, 
communications, land navigation and patrolling. The new TSCTI also attempts 
to foster informational sharing and operational planning between the states of 
the region. 
Without a doubt, the US-led War on Terror is shaping security dynamics in North 
Africa, by enlarging states’ capabilities to clamp down on anti-terrorist groups 
and political dissenters. Some experts have warned about the extent to which the 
militarisation of the Saharan desert may endanger nomadic tribes’ livelihood 
and particularly their means of subsistence. Moreover, this initiative strengthens 
the capabilities of security forces that have an extensive record of human rights 
violations (Mcelroy 2004; Keenan 2004). In Atar, Mauritania, near the southern 
border of the Western Sahara territory, the US army has carried out military 
training exercises with the Mauritanian army in a period of political turmoil in 
the country. On 3 August 2005, a coup d'état took place; the long-serving dictator 
Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya was ousted by the military of Mauritania and 
replaced by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy. Since the pan-Sahel 
initiative was put in place, the Moroccan press has denounced the presence 
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in Tindouf5 of members of radical Islamic organisations in an unsuccessful 
attempt orchestrated by Moroccan power holders to persuade US to target 
POLISARIO as an enemy in the War on Terror (Anon 2004; Anon 2007). 
Meanwhile, in October 2004, the African Union (AU) members met in Argel in a 
summit on terrorism which set up an African Centre for the Study and Research 
on Terrorism. This new centre will provide information exchange on terrorist 
cells operating in AU member states (Africa Union 2004). This was preceded 
by an agreement between the Algerian government and the US government to 
establish formal dialogue on military issues in June 2004. While the influence of 
Western security policies grows in the Sahara, terrorist activities have not ceased. 
In Algeria, clashes between the army and unidentified armed groups left several 
thousand victims throughout the 2000’s decade, with a situation of protracted 
violence in the provinces nearby Algiers and other northern provinces. Likewise, 
clashes have continued up to date and the efforts of Bouteflika’s government 
towards national reconciliation are unable to satisfy Algerian citizenship, largely 
sceptical on promises such as those expressed by the mighty General Mohamed 
Lamari. He resigned in June 2004 and it was ascertained that the army was no 
longer willing to being involved in the country’s political life (Cherfaoui 2004). 
In Morocco, terrorists hit Casablanca on 16 May 2003 and Moroccan citizens 
were also involved in Madrid’s train bombings on 11 March 2004. Since 2003, 
thousands of suspect terrorists have been jailed by Moroccan security forces. 
Moroccan and International Human Rights organisations have denounced 
arbitrary arrest, long pre-trial detention, ill-treatment and torture (Cembrero 
2004; Amnesty International 2004–2008). In the 2007 Presidential and 
Legislative elections, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party 
(PDJ) has consolidated its 2003 gains, becoming the second political force in the 
country, and for the first time the Moroccan monarchy permitted PDJ to have 
candidates in all circumscriptions. Nonetheless, the turnout in the 2007 election 
was only 37% and Islamist activists remain very influential political agents. 
In particular, Sheik d’Abdeslam Yassine’s civic movement Justice and Charity 
5 Tindouf is an Algerian town where both the Saharawi refugee camps and the POLISARIO 
headquarters are based.
125
Conflict resolution in Western Sahara
(al-Adl wa al-Ihssan) has succeeded in galvanising support for a non-capitalist, 
so-called humanitarian, socio-economic project based on the Islamic Message 
and the instauration of an Islamic Republic (Yassine 2005). 
The European Union democratisation agenda in North Africa
The European Union (EU) policy towards North Africa has been articulated 
around the so-called Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Barcelona 
declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference at the end of 
November 1995. In particular, in the framework of the so-called political and 
security partnership and the efforts to establishing a common area of peace and 
stability, the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed that:
The peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common 
asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their 
disposal (The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 1995).
Concerning conflict resolution in the region such as Western Sahara, the Euro-
Mediterranean partners undertook to:
Settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to 
renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by 
force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate 
means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law (The 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 1995).
France and Spain, alongside the US are the main economic partners of Morocco 
and Algeria. The EU is the main donor of humanitarian aid towards Saharawi 
refugees. However, the EU does not pool resources directly towards conflict 
resolution efforts in Western Sahara. These resources are mostly to support 
humanitarian programs in the camps of Tindouf (Algeria). Since 2000, the 
European Parliament (EP) has maintained an active stance through its group 
‘Intergroup Peace for the Saharawi People’, under the presidency of the German 
socialist member of the European Parliament, Margot Kessler. This group 
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has been active in lobbying the UN and EU governments to promote conflict 
resolution in Western Sahara (Intergroup Peace for the Saharawi People 2004). 
However, the European Commission (EC) has not promoted diplomatic 
initiatives such as the Road Map for Peace in the Middle East towards North 
Africa. According to Álvaro Iranzo (European Institute of the Mediterranean 
2005), General Director of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge 
of policy implementation towards the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, 
the Spanish Foreign Ministry is not in a position to become directly involved in 
top down diplomacy initiatives in the Western Sahara conflict as its main policy 
in relation to the North African area is the promotion of stability and equally 
good neighbourhood with the Algerian and Moroccan authorities. The Spanish 
administration is fearful that an active policy towards the Saharan question may 
jeopardise these efforts.
Differences among EU members in relation to common foreign and security 
policy in the Saharan case were brought to public in 2003, when most countries 
supported the new Baker plan II,6 but France remained sized to its stance to 
support the Moroccan administration which was unwilling to go along Baker’s 
new initiative. Despite France’s reluctance to support the American plan, the 
French delegation did not finally veto the Security Council Resolution on the 
Baker plan II (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1495 2003). It can be 
argued that there is a gap between the Saharan policy supported by the group of 
European parliamentarians and those policies promoted by EU State members. 
In the Saharan case, the French government has traditionally supported the 
Moroccan position and this hinders consensus building. In this sense, the extent 
to which EU common foreign policies can be successful in the second pillar 
framework is debatable because in many cases EU states’ Realpolitik is at odds 
with the promotion of international law and human rights. The lobbying role 
played by the EU Parliament and the institutional development of a common 
foreign and security policy, as specified in the Treaty of Lisbon (Assembly of 
Western European Union 2008), could eventually shorten the gap between 
6 The new Baker Plan was based on international law and the promotion of a democratic 
process through which all citizens from Western Sahara would freely choose their 
government and state affiliation.
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European member states’ agendas and the efforts to institutionalise a common 
European policy towards international conflict.
Since March 2004, the socialist government of Spain has worked on improving 
diplomatic relations between Spain and Morocco. These relations had gone 
bitter since the Parsley Island crisis in July 2002. In August 2004, there was a 
joint military operation in Haiti with forces from both countries. The first visit 
of Spanish President José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to Morocco was in April 2004 
and he mentioned Spanish willingness to promote negotiations between both 
parties in the framework of a regional agreement between all states involved in 
the Western Sahara conflict. Zapatero’s views raised concerns amongst members 
of the Spanish associations of solidarity with the Saharawi people – as Zapatero 
has not been clear on the UN role in resolving the Western Saharan conflict 
(Cruz 2004). 
On the other hand, Kessler (2004) has criticised Spanish diplomatic acquiescence 
to French policy and has pointed out that ‘this kind of apparent diplomatic 
behaviour of the new Spanish government is difficult to understand and to 
contribute for a serious European solution for the conflict, it seems more to 
respond to the French wish to hide the decolonisation file of the Sahara under 
a false and apparent normal military occupation of this Non Self-Governing 
Territory’. The Spanish government did not support a non-binding resolution 
of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Fourth Committee, the Special Political 
and Decolonisation Committee to support the Baker plan proposed by Algeria 
in October 2004 (United Nations General Assembly 2006).7 This move was 
unprecedented: for the first time since 1988, Spain did not support a UN peace 
initiative to resolve the Saharan conflict. Thus, Spanish diplomacy is working 
towards a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco as a means to facilitate 
a regional solution to the conflict based on providing autonomy for Western 
Sahara within Morocco (Segovia 2004). While Western foreign policy discourses 
emphasise democratisation as key to conflict resolution in the Arab world, their 
7 On 13 October 2006, Spain and France abstained in the UNGA resolution on Western 
Sahara. This resolution was passed with 77 votes in favour and 72 abstentions. 14 EU 
members voted in favour, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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Realpolitik is guided by national security concerns which contribute to some 
extent to protract the Western Sahara conflict.
A war on hold
On 4 July 2004, a group of ex-combatants from POLISARIO and youngsters from 
the refugee camps released a manifesto calling for a collective resignation of the 
POLISARIO leadership and urging them to organise democratic elections to elect 
new representatives. In this communiqué, the group expressed disappointment 
with the leadership of POLISARIO and their management of the peace process. 
Among other things, the communiqué criticised the progressive dismantling 
of the Saharawi Popular Army of Liberation (SPLA) and a lack of internal 
democracy and freedom of expression within the movement. The upheaval 
of critical voices within POLISARIO can be explained by the Western Saharan 
perception of progressive marginalisation of their claims in the international 
arena. This communiqué criticised the leadership of POLISARIO for neglecting 
war martyrs and questioned the efforts made by the international community 
to achieve a final solution for this conflict. This opposition group may not be 
followed by a substantial number of Western Saharan people in the refugee 
camps of Tindouf in Algeria. Nevertheless, its claims illustrate the frustration 
felt by a large sector of Saharawi society with the way the peace process unfolded 
since its inception in 1988.
On the other hand, this frustration has been also echoed within the POLISARIO 
leadership. Some top officials talk again about resuming the hostilities and they 
criticise UN peacemaking efforts (Lmrabet 2004). Western Saharan people’s 
perception is that time is running in favour of Morocco, which is investing in the 
so-called Southern Provinces to harbour the so-called Moroccan settlers, as well 
as exploiting the Western Saharan natural resources such as phosphor mining 
and fisheries. Some sectors of Western Saharan society are critical about decisions 
made by the POLISARIO leadership during the negotiations on the organisation 
of the Referendum. As some studies on MINURSO point out, POLISARIO policy 
in relation to the identification of voters and other peace plan provisions was to 
accept progressively the introduction of new variations to the settlement plan 
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which were demanded by the Moroccan counterpart since 1988 (Solà-Martín, 
2006). It can be argued that POLISARIO’s flexibility has helped the Moroccan 
party to believe in its chances to maintain its control over the Western Sahara. 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that POLISARIO’s cooperation with 
MINURSO was its only defence against Moroccan obstructionist tactics to the 
implementation of the peace process. POLISARIO adopted a flexible approach 
to the implementation of the peace agreements by acquiescing to Moroccan 
demands on the identification of voters for the Referendum in order to reach 
a political solution to the conflict by peaceful means – a solution that would be 
supported by the international community. Nevertheless, to date POLISARIO’s 
expectations remain unfulfilled. 
In this context, disagreements between the Algerian and the Moroccan 
government have resulted in an increase of tension between both countries, each 
of whom accuses the other of unwillingness to negotiate a resolution for the 
Saharan conflict. Tensions between the governments of Argel and Rabat reached 
a peak in October 2004 when Algeria deployed its army along the border with 
Morocco, in a move which the Moroccan press described as belligerent towards 
Morocco. At last, Argel decided not to organise the manoeuvres which had been 
planned to celebrate Independence War 50th anniversary in order to reduce 
mounting tension with Morocco (Borowiec 2004). 
In the current context, the Moroccan monarchy uses the Saharan conflict as 
a scapegoat to divert attention from Morocco’s internal problems linked to 
poverty and unequal access to political participation. In turn, the Saharan 
conflict brings cohesion around the king’s mighty power as a uniting force 
against perceived hostile external forces, e.g. Algeria or the UN, who are willing 
to claim the so-called kingdom’s Southern Provinces. In the last decade, some 
progress has been made in democratisation efforts in Morocco – such as a 
relative enhancement of media freedom and a sizeable flourishing of civil 
society organisations. The Equity and Reconciliation Instance (IER) promoted 
by the king has organised summary processes to clarify and compensate victims 
of political repression. Nevertheless, Amnesty International has warned that this 
openness and enhancement of civil liberties has not affected to the same extent 
the Western Sahara territory (Amnesty International 2004). For example in 2003, 
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the Saharan Section of the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice was banned 
and its members were accused of displaying pro-independence slogans and of 
supporting international organisations cooperating with the Saharawi people 
such as The European Conference of Coordination Support to the Saharawian 
People (EUCOCO) coordinated by the Belgian Pierre Galand (Kingdom of 
Morocco, Department of Justice 2003).
Meanwhile, MINURSO does not investigate human rights violations which take 
place in the territory of Western Sahara. The mission’s strength was reduced to 
a minimum expression since the negotiations on the Settlement Proposals were 
suspended at the end of 2000. Subsequently the mission focused on coordinating 
confidence-building measures agreed to by both parties: the promotion of 
peacebuilding through family visits between Saharawi families divided by the 
sand berm and the opening of new phone lines between the refugee camps and 
the cities located west of the sand berm.
The United Nations diplomatic efforts to resolve the Western 
Sahara conflict
In 2000, the UN Secretariat decided to give up the efforts towards the 
completion of the identification process, arguing that the parties were not 
ready to compromise, and suggested that the parties ‘explore ways and means to 
achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute’ (United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1292 2000).8 On 20 June 2001, Baker presented the 
so-called Framework agreement on the status of Western Sahara (Baker Plan I) 
that contained provisions for a ‘confirmatory’ referendum within the five-year 
period following the implementation of this agreement. However, the new plan 
did not specify what alternatives were to be voted on, in case the plan was not 
approved. Furthermore, those options envisaged in the Settlement Proposals, for 
independence or integration, were not even contemplated. The Baker Plan I was 
rejected by the POLISARIO Front who was still advocating the implementation 
of the UN Settlement Proposals. In 2003, after consultations with the parties, 
Baker reformulated his proposal by putting forward the so-called Peace plan 
8 This expression was first used in United Nations Secretary General Report S/2000/131 
2000.
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for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara (Baker Plan II). The 
referendum would take place 5 years after the effective date of the plan that 
would also include the ballot options previously agreed to in the Settlement 
Proposals, i.e. independence or integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. 
The plan provided that all Moroccan nationals living in the area of the Western 
Sahara territory controlled by Morocco since 1999 – who presently outnumber 
native Western Saharans – would vote in the referendum. For the first time, 
POLISARIO approved this alternative to the implementation of the Settlement 
Proposals. However, the plan was not approved by the UN Security Council 
because Morocco reacted negatively to POLISARIO’s unexpected eagerness by 
opposing the Baker Plan II. As a result of this deadlock, in June 2004, Baker 
resigned as the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and 
there was a long impasse in the UN mediated negotiations. Out of frustration, 
the so-called Saharawi Intifada, a popular uprising, was unleashed in the Western 
Sahara controlled by Morocco since May 2005. Protesters demanded political 
and socio-economic rights for Western Saharan people. 
On 11 April 2007, Morocco submitted to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
a new initiative along the lines of the Baker Plan I. Morocco’s new proposal, 
called ‘Moroccan Initiative For Negotiating An Autonomy Statute For The 
Sahara Region’, would grant autonomy for the Sahara within the framework of 
the Kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity. The Government of the Sahara 
autonomous Region would exercise similar powers over local administration to 
those enumerated in the Baker plans I and II. The Region’s autonomy statute 
would be submitted to the regions’ populations in a free referendum. However, 
the proposal did not clarify whether this alleged self-determination exercise 
would enable the Western Saharan people to choose either independence from, 
or integration into Morocco. On the other hand, POLISARIO presented an 
alternative plan stressing its traditional views regarding the implementation 
of the self-determination principle through a referendum monitored by the 
UN. Since June 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western 
Sahara, Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands, embarked on four rounds of 
negotiations with the parties to discuss both initiatives in Manhasset, Long 
Island (United States). In April 2008, the Security Council met in a closed 
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session to discuss the lack of progress in the negotiations and Peter van Walsum 
presented a document in which he claimed that an independent Western Sahara 
was not a realistic option. Van Walsum’s pro-Moroccan stance was strongly 
criticised by the POLISARIO leadership and on 4 August 2008 Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) President Mohamed Abdelaziz sent a letter to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, in which he stated 
that Van Walsum had disqualified himself from mediating between the parties. 
In September Ban Ki-Moon appointed US diplomat Christopher Ross as his 
new special envoy in Western Sahara. Ross has a long experience in the Arab 
world and his appointment was welcomed by the POLISARIO leadership who 
supports a greater US involvement in brokering a lasting solution for the conflict 
in Western Sahara. 
The new Obama administration: A window of opportunity
In 2009, the new Special Envoy for the UN Secretary-General, Christopher Ross, 
was deployed to the region to make some progress towards a peaceful solution to 
the conflict, but prospects are grim since any diplomatic solution pursued so far 
would entail the parties making concessions on the core issue of sovereignty. The 
status quo is a blessing for the occupying power and a curse for the liberation 
movement. In July 2009, US President Barack Obama wrote a letter to the King 
of Morocco, Mohammed VI, mainly on the Middle East peace process. Obama 
also requested his cooperation towards a diplomatic solution on the matter of 
Western Sahara under UN auspices (United States Government 2009):
I share your commitment to the talks under the auspices of the United 
Nations as the appropriate framework to reach a mutually acceptable 
solution, and I hope that Christopher Ross, a seasoned diplomat with wide 
experience in the region, will promote a constructive dialogue between the 
parties...My government will work with yours and others in the region to 
achieve an outcome that meets the people's need for transparent governance, 
confidence in the rule of law, and equal administration of justice... 
In this letter, Obama omitted to mention the autonomy proposal laid out by 
Mohammed VI in 2007. The latter proposal had been praised by the Bush 
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administration in its correspondence with the King of Morocco on the Western 
Sahara question. After the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1871 on 
Western Sahara, on 30 April 2009, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice did 
not refer to Morocco’s autonomy proposal either. Hence, it is apparent that the 
new US administration is intending to reverse the former US administration 
policy of endorsing Morocco’s proposal to settle the conflict. It has been actually 
pointed out unofficially by a Spanish diplomat that Obama’s administration is 
now working on a new proposal which would draw on the Baker Plan (Cembrero 
2009). The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a full member of the 
African Union whilst Morocco has been long ostracised in the African continent 
because of its refusal to allow the free will of the people of Western Sahara. 
Obama has become a flag-bearer of policy change because of his endorsement of 
principles of democratic accountability and transparency. Perhaps, this is the last 
opportunity to decolonise the last colony of Africa before Moroccan occupation 
becomes a fait accompli. However, previous experience from influential US 
policy makers such as James Baker demonstrates that Morocco is simply not 
interested in organising a referendum in Western Sahara. Paradoxically, only a 
solution that is consistent with UN doctrine and international law can break the 
current deadlock. 
Moving towards conflict resolution in Western Sahara
Shifting the diplomatic agenda beyond containment policies pursued by the US 
and EU members towards a conflict resolution approach can be the stepping 
stone towards sustainable peace in the region. MINURSO and Western policies 
of conflict containment linked to the US-led War on Terror have not promoted 
democratisation in Western Sahara. Wishful thinking perhaps, but this section 
lays out a strategy to bridge the gap between the democratisation rhetoric of 
American and European policymakers and the reality of western diplomatic 
efforts in the region. 
The international community needs to engage in an active diplomatic strategy to 
enhance support for the recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR) as a sovereign independent state and new member of the United 
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Nations – pending a final solution for the territory based on the implementation 
of UN Resolution 1514 and the UN doctrine on Non-Self governing territories 
i.e. a self-determination referendum. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
accepted the SADR as a full member in 1982. Most OAU members recognised 
the former Spanish Sahara, SADR, as a sovereign state – applying the OAU 
doctrine on the sacrality of state borders inherited from colonialism. From 
the time of the OAU inception, state sovereignty and territorial inviolability 
were bedrock principles of the organisation. Respect for territorial integrity of 
member states led them to accept the principle of uti possidetis with regard to 
state boundaries. Uti possidetis provides that borders that were determined by 
colonial powers prior to independence were not to be altered and would form 
the permanent frontiers of the independent African states.9 Since 2001, the OAU 
was dissolved in favour of a new organization, the African Union (AU), and 
some reconceptualisation of the role of the organisation was undertaken, mainly 
regarding its role in humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, uti possidetis remains a 
bedrock principle as envisaged in Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act. According 
to article 4, the Union shall function in accordance with sovereign equality and 
interdependence among member states of the AU and respect of borders existing 
on achievement of independence (Gardner 2000).
Since the peace process became deadlocked, some states that had recognised 
the SADR during the Cold War period have withdrawn their recognition or 
put it on hold until the referendum process comes to an end. Some among the 
poorest African nations have withdrawn recognition after reaching political and 
economic cooperation agreements with the Moroccan government.10 On the 
other hand, on 15 November 2004, the Republic of South Africa announced 
its official recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 
according to a joint communiqué signed by the Saharawi Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Salek and Mrs. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
9 This principle of uti possidetis was implicitly recognised in Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the 
OAU Charter.
10 Former President of Liberia Charles Taylor withdrew SADR recognition in 1997. 
Equatorial Guinea withdrew SADR recognition in 1980. In 2002 the US-supported post-
Taliban government of Afghanistan withdrew SADR recognition.
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South African Minister for Foreign Affairs. This communiqué stated that this 
South African initiative ‘will bring a highly valued contribution to the return 
of peace and stability in the northern part of our continent through a fair and 
balanced approach towards all peoples of the region’ (Sahara Press Service 2004). 
Therefore, South African policy intended to galvanise international support 
towards recognition of the SADR and the promotion of conflict resolution in 
the region.
Western European states have never recognised SADR, but there are some 
indications that some of these countries are reconsidering their policies on this 
issue. In Norway, there is a growing consensus among the ruling coalition parties 
that SADR recognition is the way forward to break the current diplomatic 
stalemate. In January 2007 the Norwegian Liberal Party adopted a resolution 
demanding official Norwegian recognition of SADR. On 22 April 2007, the 
National Council of Socialist Left Part (SV) issued a declaration urging Norway 
to recognise the SADR. The declaration also pointed out that Norwegian business 
operating in the Western Sahara controlled by Morocco contributed to sustain 
the occupying power and advised the government to discourage Norwegian 
companies to invest or commercialise goods in Western Sahara till the conflict 
is resolved. Elsewhere in Europe, the recognition of Western Sahara is currently 
being discussed as a policy option. In April 2007, at its annual congress, the EU 
association of liberal youth parties, European Liberal Youth (LYMEC),11 issued 
a resolution calling on European governments to formally recognise the SADR 
as an independent state. The liberal parties agreed to put pressure on the mother 
parties to pursue this goal. 
A workable and lasting peace strategy for Western Sahara will only succeed if the 
international community assumes a more robust role in clarifying human rights 
violations and promoting confidence-building measures so that the refugees can 
return to the Western Sahara territory. Since Emmanuel Rocounas resigned in 
1999 as MINURSO’s International Jurist to clarify Saharan disappearances, this 
post remains vacant (United Nations Secretary General Report S/1999/954 1999). 
11 LYMEC has member organisations in 37 European countries and almost 250 000 
individual members throughout Europe.
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An unpublished report produced by the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) on Western Sahara in 2006 stressed the extent 
to which human rights in Western Sahara can only be effectively protected by 
promoting the organisation of a referendum for the self-determination of the 
Western Saharan people (OHCHR 2006). This report was kept secret, once more, 
due to diplomatic fears that the report’s findings would upset the Moroccan 
regime. Nevertheless, its conclusions certainly support the argument laid out in 
this paper that UN policy in relation the Sahara needs to move towards Western 
Saharan statehood. Only this option provides the basis for protecting Western 
Saharan people from political repression, while ways are devised to work on 
the parties’ consent for a referendum to take place across the territory to define 
whether the territory of Western Sahara becomes an independent state or is 
integrated into Morocco. Time is ripe for the Obama administration to work 
in partnership with other members of the Security Council, African States, 
the EU and Spain in order to endorse a new mandate for MINURSO based on 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. MINURSO should play a new role to protect the 
people of Western Sahara from human rights abusers and only then a peaceful 
and lasting solution based on decolonisation doctrine can be pursued: the long 
overdue self-determination referendum should be monitored by UN military 
and civilian observers across the Western Sahara territory.
Concluding remarks
This paper argues for a strategy of maximising efforts to implement a UN plan for 
the self-determination of the Western Saharan people, advocating international 
recognition of SADR. Renewed efforts by the international community to 
achieve this end will only be fruitful if Western countries in cooperation 
with the AU show political eagerness to move the process forward. There is 
a wide range of literature on post-Cold War peacekeeping and humanitarian 
intervention that stresses the extent to which these practices involve exporting 
Western liberal democratic practices to war-torn societies as a means of conflict 
resolution (Duffield 2001; Bellamy et al. 2004). However, the Western Sahara 
case illustrates the extent to which power politics have overshadowed conflict 
resolution efforts in North Africa. Morocco bases its strategy on blocking any 
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solution that challenges its control over the Western Sahara. On the other 
hand, from the onset of the peace process, POLISARIO has supported all 
UN-sponsored peace proposals to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. To date, 
the prospects for a broader involvement of the West in the promotion of Western 
Saharan people’s rights in the current international framework dominated by 
the US-led War on Terror are rather grim. This is a dangerous situation and 
conflicts in Israel/Palestine or Cyprus provide strong evidence that protracted 
military occupations of disputed territories lead to deeply divided and polarised 
societies. The Western Sahara conflict has been contained but not resolved and 
this dispute will remain a roadblock for the promotion of economic and political 
cooperation in the Maghreb region unless courageous diplomatic initiatives 
such as greater international backing for Western Saharan statehood are put on 
the peace table. 
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